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Price Is a Better Climate Commitment 
PETEr CramTon and STEVEn SToFT
“M
itigation. Transparency. 
Financing.”  That  was 
President Obama’s for-
mula  for  Copenhagen. 
While  emission  caps 
may appear transparent, their consequences 
are  opaque,  and  they  impose  financial  risk 
rather  than  provide  financing.  Caps  satisfy 
only the first part of Obama’s formula. More-
over they have been rejected once again by 
all  developing  countries,  which  will  leave 
the bulk of emission increases in the coming 
years  uncapped  and  outside  of  any  carbon 
pricing regime.
To  correct  this  vast  omission,  we  pro-
pose a new pair of commitments—a commit-
ment to a binding carbon-price target and to 
a Green Fund financed by a form of carbon 
pricing. Together these satisfy all three parts 
of  Obama’s  formula  and  solve  many  of  the 
problems  caps  create.  The  result  is  a  price 
mechanism that brings countries together in-
stead of pushing them apart.
The price commitment does not interfere 
with  distant  aspirational  goals.  In  fact,  be-
cause the price commitment facilitates agree-
ment and then reinforces it with incentives, it 
provides real hope that such aspirations may 
be realized. 
The question of which international com-
mitment is preferable, a cap or a price, should 
not  be  confused  with  the  domestic  debate 
over whether to use cap and trade, a carbon 
tax, or some mix of the two. Either commit-
ment, to a cap or a price, can be met with 
either domestic policy. So under a price com-
mitment,  industrialized  countries  can  adopt 
cap and trade, while developing countries can 
tax fossil fuels. With either domestic policy, 
performance is rewarded on the basis of the 
country’s carbon price relative to the global 
price target.
a price target is essential
M
uch has been invested in promoting in-
ternational  emission  targets,  but  pres-
sure  to  accept  emission  targets  has  caused 
an  increasingly  acrimonious  divide  between 
rich and poor nations. And nothing indicates 
that  the  next  thirteen  years  of  negotiation 
will prove more productive than the previous 
thirteen.  Switching  to  a  global  price  target 
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eliminates  the  issues  developing  countries 
have with caps and opens up the possibility of 
a successful, binding international agreement. 
This is no minor distinction between better 
and best.
In spite of this stark difference, one impor-
tant similarity should be kept in mind. Emis-
sion caps that are implemented with cap and 
trade  work  through  the  price  mechanism.  A 
tight  cap  causes  high  allowance  prices,  and 
companies react to those prices. Under cap and 
trade or fossil-fuel taxes, the carbon price is the 
best  summary  measure  of  a  country’s  incen-
tive to abate emissions. Besides this similarity, a 
price target has a number of crucial advantages.
A  price  target  avoids  the  imposition  of 
caps  on  developing  countries.  The  United 
States  favors  national  caps  based  on  trend-
line emissions, which would mean capping 
India at per-capita emission levels not seen 
in the United States in well over one hundred 
years. But developing countries ask, “By what 
right are the developed countries entitled to 
pollute  more  than  we  are,  simply  because 
they polluted more in the past?”1 By contrast, 
a  price  target  does  not  limit  India  to  emit 
any less than the United States, and instead 
asks for effort levels that are proportional to 
emissions, and hence closely correlated with 
ability to pay.
A  global  price  target  facilitates  negotia-
tions, because the focus is on a single target 
that embodies the common objective of abat-
ing  world  emissions.  If  a  single  global  cap 
could control the sum of all national caps, 
negotiating  that  single  cap  would  have  the 
same negotiating advantage as that of a global 
price  target.  But  negotiating  a  global  price 
target  sets  all  national  price  targets,  while 
choosing a single global cap tells us nothing 
about  national  caps.  And  negotiating  indi-
vidual national caps is contentious because 
caps are equivalent to money, so each country 
desires a higher cap for itself and lower caps 
for others.
Were all countries identical, then the ne-
gotiation would be relatively straightforward 
under  either  price  or  cap,  since  setting  the 
same national cap for each country would be 
focal. However, the global debate is charac-
terized  by  extreme  asymmetries  in  wealth, 
current  emissions,  and  historical  emissions. 
It  is  precisely  these  asymmetries  that  make 
negotiating national caps difficult.
A third advantage is that a price target is 
more  easily  enforced  because  it  is  a  steady 
commitment.  Performance  can  be  assessed 
and rewarded on a continuous basis. A com-
mitment to distant caps is much more apt to 
break down when procrastination is followed 
by the day of reckoning.
a price target reduces risk
R
elative to a global cap, a price target re-
duces  a  country’s  risk  of  commitment. 
The cost of unexpected growth is much high-
er under commitment to a cap than under a 
price target. 
As  an  example,  consider  the  impact  on 
China of unexpected emissions growth under 
a cap and under a price commitment. First, 
suppose that with expected growth the global 
cap would result in a carbon price of $30 per 
ton, and that at that price China’s cap would 
equal  its  emissions.  Also  suppose  the  price 
target is $30 per ton. In this expected case, 
the two commitments have the same cost.
But what if China’s emissions grow by a 
billion tons more than expected, while world 
emissions  change  as  expected?  Under  ei-
ther commitment, the world-price of carbon -3-
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remains at $30, and therefore China’s price 
also remains at $30 per ton. So the abatement 
costs are identical. Also, domestic carbon rev-
enues under a cap or taxes are equal. The only 
difference is that under a cap, China must buy 
one billion carbon permits from other coun-
tries at a cost of $30 billion; whereas, with 
taxes, the $30 billion stays within China.
Hence,  with  unexpectedly  high  growth, 
commitment to a cap imposes an additional 
$30 billion cost to buy international carbon 
permits. Such purchases could also impose a 
high political cost, especially if the permits 
are purchased from countries that have his-
torically emitted more than China. Between 
2000 and 2010, China’s unanticipated emis-
sions  growth  was  about  twice  as  much  as 
assumed here.
the price target and the green fund
O
ur proposal comprises two interrelated 
parts, the first of which is commitment 
by participating countries to a single global 
price target, which is expected to increase over 
time. This commitment requires that a coun-
try either collect carbon revenue equal to the 
price target times the country’s total emissions 
or pay others to make up the carbon-revenue 
shortfall. The forms of revenue collection uti-
lized, such as taxing fossil fuels or auctioning 
allowances, are left up to the country. Certain 
other polices, discussed below, also count to-
wards revenue. The revenues collected are re-
tained by the country. 
Especially with a domestic cap and trade 
policy, there is a possibility that the country’s 
revenues may be above or below the target. 
To motivate the country to set a cap (or a tax) 
consistent with the target price, the Pricing 
Incentive pays Z × (excess carbon revenue), 
where Z, the incentive strength, may be about 
10 percent. Since each country keeps the car-
bon revenue it collects but looses any negative 
Pricing Incentive payment, an incentive like 
10 percent probably is sufficient to achieve 
global  carbon  revenues  consistent  with  the 
price  target.  These  incentive  payments  also 
mimic the flexibility of international trade in 
carbon  allowances,  which  allows  countries 
to miss their domestic emission targets and 
instead buy or sell carbon permits on the in-
ternational market. 
If global revenues are too low, the incentive 
strength is increased; if global revenues are 
too high, the incentive strength is decreased. 
These  adjustments  assure  average  carbon 
pricing  consistent  with  the  price  target  as 
well as budget balance over time.2 
The  second  part  of  the  proposal  is  the 
Green  Fund,  which  provides:  equity  trans-
fers,  improved  pricing  compliance,  and 
motivation  for  non-price  climate  policies. 
Developing  countries  with  low  per-capita 
emissions  would  be  justifiably  reluctant  to 
commit to a price target without some further 
inducement. A Green Fund provides this by 
rewarding low-emission countries for verified 
compliance  with  the  global  pricing  target. 
Fully-compliant  countries  with  emissions 
per-capita that are below the global average 
by  D  tons  per  person  receive  a  per-capita 
payment of G × D. The incentive strength, G, 
might be, for example, $2 per ton. Countries 
with above-average emissions make payments 
according to the same formula, which results 
in a balanced Green Fund budget.
The United States, which emits about 20 
tons per capita per year (CO2 only) compared 
to the global average of 5 tons per year, would 
pay about (20 – 5) × 2 = $30 per person per 
year  into  the  fund.  India,  with  per-capita -4-
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emissions of about 1 ton per year would re-
ceive a payment of (5 – 1) × 2 = $8 per per-
son from the fund. In the case of India, the 
Green Fund payment more than offsets India’s 
abatement cost caused by complying with a 
$30-per-ton carbon tax.
The full mechanism depends on just two 
key,  internationally-negotiated  parameters: 
the  price  target  (illustrated  at  $30  per  ton) 
and the Green Fund incentive (illustrated at 
$2 per ton). The global carbon price motivates 
private  emission  reductions,  while  Green 
Fund  payments  encourage  national  reduc-
tion programs. The Pricing Incentive ensures 
performance globally. Secondary enforcement 
can come from trade sanctions, but this typi-
cally would be unnecessary.
emission ‘certainty’
E
mission  targets  are  said  to  provide 
certainty. But remote and moving targets 
are most accurately hit by guided systems and 
not by an unguided system such as a cap set 
40 years in advance. The standard approach 
is to use periodic estimates of the location of 
the target and the trajectory of the system to 
adjust one or more control variables, such as 
price.  The  idea  that  a  newly  formed  world 
organization might set a cap on all the world’s 
emissions that would hold for forty years and 
then achieve the ideal climate objective is fan-
ciful. Curiously, some argue caps provide this 
outcome with certainty.
Either an emission target or a global price 
target  will  need  adjusting  many  times,  and 
it will be far easier to reset one price target 
than to renegotiate more than one hundred 
emission targets. Moreover the ultimate tar-
get should not be an emission level, but some 
climate variable such as a global temperature. 
It will be easier to set and meet such a long-
range goal under a system of price commit-
ments than a system of caps. 
non-price policies
M
any  emission-reduction  policies  do 
not  price  carbon.  What  will  become 
of such policies? We hope many inappropri-
ate subsidies will disappear because they are 
not rewarded, or in the case of fossil subsi-
dies, because they are counted against carbon 
revenues.  Others  policies,  such  as  fuel  effi-
ciency standards, could be recast as feebates, 
which are easily equated with carbon pricing. 
(Feebates are revenue-neutral fee-and-rebate 
combinations based on, say, carbon emissions 
over an average auto lifetime.)
Other policies may be shoe-horned into 
the system with more difficulty and more risk 
of undermining the standard. But some poli-
cies will not be amenable to quantification as 
substitutes  for  carbon  pricing.  Fortunately, 
Green  Fund  payments,  both  positive  and 
negative, will provide a uniform incentive for 
all countries to engage in such policies. Bas-
ing these payments purely on emissions-per-
capita,  and  not  on  say,  historical  emissions 
or  income,  maximizes  the  strength  of  the 
Green Fund incentive. Of course it should be 
equal in strength to the incentive provided 
by carbon pricing, so it will almost certainly 
be  too  weak.  However,  because  Green 
Fund  payments  involve  politically  sensitive 
international monetary transfers, we believe 
the  incentive  for  non-price  polices  will  be 
given extra weight. Similarly, the Green Fund 
encourages  the  implementation  of  carbon 
pricing in the most effective manner.
Because  non-price  policies  will  be 
reasonably well motivated via the Green Fund, 
and  because  attempting  to  assign  carbon -5-
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prices to non-price policies (other than fee-
bates) is the first step down the slippery slope 
to  wasteful  subsidies,  we  recommend  that 
only taxes, caps and feebates be counted as 
carbon pricing.
the low cost of carbon pricing
C
arbon  pricing,  however  implemented, 
is the most inexpensive policy that can 
define commitment to an international agree-
ment.  As  explained  above,  the  riskiness  of 
committing to a cap means no country can 
count on the low cost of carbon pricing. Un-
der  capping,  only  the  world  as  a  whole  is 
guaranteed a low cost. But with a global price 
target, each country is guaranteed a low cost, 
and that cost is so low that, if understood, it 
should greatly facilitate commitment.
In  spite  of  the  prominence  of  carbon 
pricing,  a  basic  accounting  of  its  costs  is 
remarkably difficult to discover, perhaps be-
cause national costs are made uncertain by 
the need for international allowance trading. 
In the absence of such trading, national costs 
can be well approximated with a formula that 
the  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency 
uses for exactly this purpose.3 
This formula allows us to construct a simple 
example of carbon-pricing abatement costs. The 
example  also  includes  the  Green  Fund  assis-
tance from industrialized countries to develop-
ing countries. The results are shown in Table 1.
Carbon pricing is assumed to reduce emis-
sions by 20 percent from the amount shown. 
Note that China is quite close to being an av-
erage country in per-capita emissions.
The low costs in Table 1, given in cents per 
person per day, depend on three assumptions. 
First, the global carbon price is taken to be $30 
per ton. Second, the Green Fund incentive is 
assumed to be $2 per ton of emissions above or 
below the world average per-capita emissions 
rate. Third, the resulting reduction in emissions 
is taken to be 20 percent. The first two assump-
tions are choices of the international commu-
nity. But the amount of emission reduction for 
a  fixed  carbon  price  will  undoubtedly  differ 
from 20 percent. If the reduction were only 10 
percent, the abatement costs would be cut in 
half. And if it were instead 40 percent, abate-
ment cost would double, but this accomplish-
ment at such a low cost would be stupendous. 
Hence no error in the assumption regarding the 
percent of emission reduction can change the 
results in a way that would tend to disrupt a 
climate agreement.
The conclusion must be that a strong cli-
mate policy can be extremely inexpensive. Even 
for the United States, the cost per person is less 
Table 1 





Green Fund Cost Total Cost
(tons/year)  ( cents per person per day )
India 1 0.8 ¢ −1.7 ¢ −0.9 ¢
Average Country 5 4.1 ¢ 0.0 ¢ 4.1 ¢
United States 20 16.4 ¢ 6.6¢ 23.0 ¢
Carbon pricing is assumed to reduce admissions by 20 percent from the amount shown. Note that China is 
quite close to being an average country in per-capita emissions.-6-
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than a quarter per day ($84 per year), which is 
less than 1/5 of one percent of GDP. And this 
covers  the  cost  of  subsidizing  low-emission 
countries such as India by roughly double their 
own abatement costs. These subsidies are one-
third the level that EPA estimates for interna-
tional  subsidies  under  the  Waxman-Markey 
bill.4  Perhaps  some  will  argue  that  such  low 
costs are still unfair to those who are poorest, 
yet if national policies are implemented with 
equal-per-person refunds, the poor will come 
out ahead.
If  the  carbon  price  of  Table  1,  $30  per 
ton,  were  implemented  through  2020,  the 
cost to China would make China wait until 13 
July 2020 to be as rich as it would otherwise 
have been on 1 July 2020.5 Since cost is the 
principle barrier to international agreement, 
allowing commitment to a global carbon price 
will  greatly  increase  the  chance  of  interna-
tional agreement. And that will increase the 
chance  of  a  significant  commitment  by  the 
United States and others.
conclusion
I
n 2007 Stiglitz doubted that we would “find 
an agreement acceptable to both the United 
States and the developing countries within the 
Kyoto approach [to national caps].” The Co-
penhagen Accord confirms this. On the present 
course, the great bulk of future emissions in-
creases will not be covered by carbon pricing. 
Instead we will depend on a suite of “Nation-
ally Appropriate Mitigation Actions,” selected 
and undertaken by developing countries but 
mainly funded by industrial countries. These 
multipurpose subsidies will likely prove par-
ticularly inefficient at reducing emissions.
The lack of comparable commitments on 
the part of major developing countries, and in 
particular the lack of comparable carbon pric-
ing on goods produced using energy intensive 
technologies, will cause the U.S. Senate to balk 
at any significant level of carbon pricing by the 
United States. The combination of weak pric-
ing in the United States and negligible carbon 
pricing in China will limit the willingness to 
commit in the rest of the industrialized world. 
In short the Kyoto approach of capping emis-
sions has hit a dead end.
To overcome this, a new form of interna-
tional commitment is necessary. That cannot 
be  a  commitment  to  a  carbon  tax  because 
cap  and  trade  has  insurmountable  political 
advantages in a number of industrial coun-
tries. Fortunately, caps at the domestic level 
can coexist with a price commitment at the 
international level. Meaningful and effective 
international commitments should be based 
on binding commitments to a single global 
carbon-price target. The approach is simple, 
effective, and remarkably affordable.
Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be  submitted  at  http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
submit.cgi?context=ev.
notes
1.  The present proposal can be viewed as an extension 
of one made by Stiglitz (2006). The quote is from 
Stiglitz (2007). 
2.  See Stoft (2009a) for a slight modification of the 
Pricing Incentive formula that achieves budget bal-
ance each year.
3.  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA) 
(2009) EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2009 H.R. 2454 in the 111th 
Congress,” June 23, 2009 at 14.
4.  The Green-Fund subsidy is $7 billion per year com-
pared with the EPA’s (2009, 14) estimate of $20 bil-
lion for foreign offsets in 2020. 
5.  This is based on the U.S. DOE’s International Ener-
gy Outlook 2009, and documented on www.global-
energy.org.-7-
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